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Abstract Previous research ﬁnds evidence that tax factors motivate the
participants in leasing transactions. Tax-arbitrage arguments
predict that leasing participants gain when the lessor’s tax rate
exceeds that of the lessee. This research employs a sample of
effectively tax-exempt Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT)
lessors to explore alternative leasing motives. Changes in REIT
qualiﬁcation rules are examined to develop an Agency-Cost and
competing Income-Retention Hypothesis for lessors. The rules
and changes suggest that REIT management has the incentive,
motive, and opportunity to make real estate investments quickly.
The evidence developed is consistent with agency costs arising
from the possibility that they may overpay for properties.
Theoretical models of ﬁnancial leasing like those developed in Miller and Upton
(1976), Lewellen, Long and McConnell (1976), Myers, Dill, and Bautista (1976),
Brealey and Young (1980), and Brick, Fung, and Subrahmanyam (1990) highlight
differential tax rates between lessors and lessees as a primary motive for leasing.
Alvayay, Rutherford, and Smith (1995), Moyer and Krishnan (1995), and Lasfer
and Levis (1998) ﬁnd evidence that tax considerations are an important factor
explaining leasing activity. Conversely, Eades and Marston (2002) conclude that
their research provides little evidence that taxes drive the leasing decisions of the
largest lessors (or lessees). They also note that the tax arbitrage hypothesis predicts
that leasing participants beneﬁt when the lessor is in a tax bracket higher than
that of the lessee. This research employs a sample of qualiﬁed Real Estate
Investment Trust (REIT) lessor ﬁrms that are effectively ‘‘tax exempt’’ (actually
they may deduct their dividends for tax purposes) to develop evidence on
alternative motives for participating in these sale-leaseback (SLB) transactions.
Thus, the standard differential tax model does not adequately account for the
interest of REITs in SLB transactions. Two alternative hypotheses are developed
in this paper that reﬂect both the nature of REIT operations and the regulations
they must satisfy to remain qualiﬁed as REITs.1382  Elayan, Meyer, and Li
The ﬁrst hypothesis is that REIT managers are not clearly acting in their
shareholders’ best interests by engaging in SLBs and it is termed the Agency-Cost
Hypothesis. It reﬂects the conclusion in Graff (2001:109) that REIT ‘‘managers
routinely overpay for asset acquisitions.’’ Several observations in Graff lead to this
conclusion. First, REIT managers have an incentive to commit capital promptly
due to the ‘‘75% income test.’’ Second, REIT managers are compensated on the
basis of total assets managed. Third, detailed information is not publicly-available
that would allow analysts to develop accurate assessments of property valuations.
Fourth, the ‘‘5-50 test,’’ which was originally designed to expand the number of
shareholders, has actually insulated incumbent management from the threat of a
takeover by a small group of investors. Finally, many REITs have adopted anti-
takeover provisions, which virtually ensure that hostile takeovers as a mechanism
to discipline poorly-performing management are impossible.
The second, competing hypothesis is termed the Income-Retention Hypothesis and
it suggests a more beneﬁcent management motive for SLBs. The lobbying efforts
by the National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts (NAREIT) to have
the minimum required dividend payout ratio to maintain REIT status lowered from
95% to 90% (under the 1999 REIT Modernization Act) suggest that income
retention is a matter of considerable importance to REIT management. REITs may
deduct their dividends (required to be paid) from before-tax income. Interestingly,
they are similar to taxable C-corporations in that they also deduct both
depreciation and debt-interest expense from their income.2 SLB transactions allow
REITs to generate both types of deductible expenses, reducing their ‘‘taxable’’
income. However, these SLBs offer several added beneﬁts (described below),
compared to purchase-and-lease transactions, which suggests an advantage to
SLBs. Market reaction to these SLB announcements from both the REIT lessor
and non-REIT lessee perspectives is the focus of this study.
Reaction to SLB announcements for lessors is found to be negative but
insigniﬁcant. This result is clearly not consistent with the implications of the
Income-Retention Hypothesis, but its insigniﬁcance does not necessarily support
the Agency-Cost Hypothesis. Further analysis using multiple regressions to
discriminate between the two hypotheses is shown to provide greater support for
the agency-cost explanation.
On the lessee side, two hypotheses are examined that reﬂect conﬂicting ﬁndings
regarding either tax motives or credit availability from previous research. The ﬁrst
motive is termed the Tax-Beneﬁt Hypothesis. It reﬂects the possibility that the
lessees may be able to share the (tax) advantages the REIT lessors gain through
SLBs [i.e., depreciation (and possibly interest) deductions]. A second alternative
motive for lessees is that SLBs afford them an advantageous way of obtaining
needed ﬁnancing when it is difﬁcult or more costly to obtain from other sources.
Event-study market model tests display a signiﬁcant positive market reaction to
SLB announcements for lessee ﬁrms. This ﬁnding is consistent with previous
research and both hypotheses. The multiple regressions used to distinguish
between the hypotheses are interpreted as supporting the hypothesis that SLBsEvidence from Tax-Exempt Firms  383
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provide lessees the opportunity to obtain needed ﬁnancing (or clean up their
balance sheets) through the monetization of bricks and mortar.
The next section describes the qualiﬁcations that REITs must satisfy to maintain
their tax-exempt status and provides an overview of sale-leaseback activity. Next
is a discussion of previous studies on leasing that are related to this research. The
hypotheses, data collection, and the methods of analysis employed are then
discussed, followed by an examination of the empirical ﬁndings. Finally, the
research highlights are presented, along with conclusions regarding the alternative
motives for leasing.
 Sale-Leaseback Financing and Requirements for REIT
Qualification
REIT Qualification Requirements
Real estate investment trust characteristics and qualiﬁcation requirements are
discussed in section 856 of the Internal Revenue Code. A REIT is deﬁned as a
corporation that invests principally in real estate and mortgages and elects special
tax treatment as a qualiﬁed REIT. A REIT may deduct the dividends it distributes
to its shareholders from its taxable income, effectively allowing it to serve as a
conduit. However, if the trust generates an operating loss, this cannot be passed
on to its shareholders as a tax credit (Allen and Sirmans, 1987). Although a REIT
must be a corporation for tax purposes, it can be formed as a trust under local
law. Most REITs are relatively small corporations3 and nearly half are not publicly
traded.
The most important requirements a corporation must meet to qualify as a REIT
may be summarized as follows. The ﬁrst condition is that REITs have to distribute
90% of their income as cash dividends. The second is that REITs are required to
maintain a relatively diverse shareholder base. This ownership requirement
prohibits any ﬁve or fewer shareholders from owning 50% or more of the REIT’s
stock (the 5–50 rule). Further, REITs cannot be closely held, as there must be at
least 100 shareowners. Third, 75% of the assets must be in the form of mortgages,
real estate equities, cash, or government securities. Fourth, a minimum of 75% of
REIT gross income must be derived from mortgages, rents, and property sale gains
(the 75% income test). Fifth, the REIT must not have accumulated earnings from
years when it was not a qualiﬁed REIT. Sixth, prior to the REIT Modernization
Act of 1986, independent real estate professionals were required to be employed
to carry out speciﬁc management activities. However, since the enactment of this
legislation, REITs have been permitted to manage their own properties (Graff,
2001). Finally, real property should not be owned principally for sale in the course
of ordinary business.
If a REIT satisﬁes the qualifying conditions, it is effectively tax exempt and its
shareholders avoid double taxation on corporate distributions. The growth of384  Elayan, Meyer, and Li
REITs as vehicles for real estate investment demonstrates that many investors
believe this qualiﬁcation confers a net tax beneﬁt to shareholders.
Sale-Leaseback Characteristics
The sale-leaseback arrangement has become a popular means of ﬁnancing real
estate for a variety of reasons. This transaction has traditionally been used to create
an alternative to mortgage ﬁnancing of business properties. The most important
advantage is that 100% of the purchase price is effectively being loaned, compared
to a typical secured loan where 60%–70% of the property’s value would serve as
the loan basis. In a ‘‘properly-arranged’’ transaction, it can offer both business-
economic and tax advantages. Corporations are increasingly realizing that funds
invested in real estate can be more effectively deployed in their core businesses
and are using sale-leaseback ﬁnancing to convert bricks and mortar into an
additional source of ﬁnancing. In this sense, the lessor is effectively acting as a
lender of ﬁnancing provided to the lessee.
A real estate sale-leaseback (SLB) typically involves the purchase of a corporate
headquarters, distribution facility, manufacturing facility, laboratory, or other
physical property by the buyer (lessor) that will continue to be used by the seller
(lessee). As part of the arrangement, the former corporate owner leases the facility
back from the purchaser for a period of time, typically 10 to 25 years, and the
seller retains control of the property. Many SLBs are structured as ‘‘triple net,’’
meaning that the seller/lessee remains responsible for all operating expenses,
insurance, taxes, and maintenance of the property. The assets sold may consist of
a speciﬁc property or multiple properties. Although ‘‘build-to-suits’’ are typically
used to fund the projects while they are being constructed (due to better tax and
ﬁnancial accounting beneﬁts) SLBs may also be employed to ﬁnance projects
under construction.4
The lessor is typically an established institutional entity, such as a REIT,
partnership, or limited liability corporation. If acting in the best interests of its
shareholders, the lessor offers a lease rate that reﬂects their own cost of capital,
and conversely the lessee will not borrow from the REIT unless the terms are
better than those offered by other lenders. An SLB affords ﬁnancing equal to
100% of the market value, in contrast to mortgage ﬁnancing where the amount
ﬁnanced is usually less than property’s full value. The SLB thereby frees up cash
that may be employed to fund internal expansion, as well for other investment
purposes. It may also be used to pay off debt and enhance borrowing capacity.
Lessees also obtain operating ﬂexibility, as SLB ﬁnancing does not impose the
operating covenants that traditional ﬁnancing would (Pappas, 1996). A potential
disadvantage to the lessee is that once the SLB is executed, they may not vacate
the property as easily (as if they still owned the property) due to the ﬁnite lease
obligation. Further, any residual property values accrue to the landlord.
Sale-leasebacks are treated as operating leases from an accounting standpoint,
meaning they are not shown as a debt obligation on the lessee’s balance sheetEvidence from Tax-Exempt Firms  385
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provided that they meet certain Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB)
criteria. In addition, the lessee’s lease payments are fully deductible and may
generate deductions greater than the interest and depreciation deductions that
would have been available without the sale. This situation is especially likely when
the property sold includes land rather than depreciable assets.
The major non-tax beneﬁt for the lessor is that the return earned on the lease is
typically higher than the interest income that would have been received if the
transaction had been structured as a loan rather than a sale. The lessor also has
recourse to the property if the lessee defaults. How advantageous this repossession
is depends on the availability of other lessees, the current value of the property,
and the amount of debt service. The tax beneﬁts to the lessor will include the
depreciation allowance and the interest deduction on any loan used to purchase
the property.
There are several beneﬁts of the SLB to the REIT lessor as compared to outright
purchase of the asset and then searching for a tenant. First, since most SLBs are
for relatively long terms (10–25 years), the REIT has a long-term tenant
guaranteed. Thus, they do not need to purchase the property speculatively and
search for a tenant. The immediacy of having a tenant is important in satisfying
the 75% income test in light of the required one-year investment horizon. Second,
when the REIT (or any other potential lessor) is considering prospective SLB
customers, they are able to evaluate the lessee’s credit quality on a pre-purchase
basis. This provides an advantage in comparison to a situation where the REIT
would purchase a vacant property, and then search for a tenant with an unevaluated
credit history. This ability to pre-evaluate a potential lessee’s credit quality might
also allow the REIT to focus on ﬁrms with lower credit quality and then
conceivably earn higher returns. Finally, if the REIT itself requires ﬁnancing to
execute the SLB, the lease payment (or part of it) can be used to offset the lessor’s
loan payment, and so the SLB is in that sense self-ﬁnancing. Further, the size of
the REIT portfolio will be increased due to the SLB (generating increased
management fees) and it will also beneﬁt from any property value appreciation.
 Review of the Literature
Agency Costs of REITs as SLB Lenders
Differential tax rates between lessors and lessees as a primary motive for leasing
have been highlighted in theoretical models like those developed in Lewellen,
Long, and McConnell (1976), Miller and Upton (1976), Myers, Dill, and Bautista
(1976), Brealey and Young (1980), and Brick, Fung, and Subrahmanyam (1990).
Tax considerations are found to be an important factor explaining leasing activity
in Alvayay, Rutherford, and Smith (1995), Moyer and Krishnan (1995), and Lasfer
and Levis (1998). However, as noted by Eades and Marston (2002:7), ‘‘The tax
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tax bracket than the lessee.’’ Since the tax rate of the REIT lessors in this study
is effectively zero, non-tax reasons may be motivating their participation in SLBs.
Several researchers have analyzed the agency costs related to the REIT operating
structure or the regulations they must follow to remain qualiﬁed for their
effectively tax-exempt status. Webb and McIntosh (1986) conclude that REIT
share price may, or may not, reﬂect the value of the underlying assets and this
fact may affect REIT managers’ investment rules. Cannon and Vogt (1995)
consider the possible agency problems between ‘‘self-administered’’ (internally-
advised) and ‘‘advisor’’ REITs due to the 1986 REIT Modernization Act (RMA).
They ﬁnd that internally-advised (I-A) REITs outperform those with external
management even after adjusting for risk. Mueller (1998) looks at the effects of
the 1986 RMA and suggests that growth in total assets does not equal growth in
funds from operations. Along this same line, Ambrose and Linneman (2001)
document the growth of I-A REITs, but conclude that the evidence is mixed
regarding whether they exhibit superior performance compared to those externally-
managed.
Graff and Webb (1997) develop evidence of persistence in the annual National
Council of Real Estate Investment Fiduciaries (NCREIF) property returns. Their
ﬁndings suggest that this imposes an agency cost since it implies institutional
portfolio assets were acquired at substantially misvalued (i.e., overpriced) prices
and this results in underperformance by the investments. Graff (2001) notes that
the more restrictive secrecy policies of REITs keeps their investors in even greater
ignorance than do the policies of other institutional real estate management. Graff
examines the 75% income rule and concludes that it encourages REIT managers
to commit capital more promptly than other institutional managers. Further, since
REIT management is not required to liquidate properties or return investor capital,
he suggests they will attribute a greater present value to the management fees they
will collect than do managers of closed-end and open-end funds. The 5–50 test
for REIT qualiﬁcation was meant to ensure a diverse ownership base. Graff points
out that an unintended consequence is that it also acts to make it difﬁcult for any
dissident group of shareholders to gain majority control and replace entrenched,
poorly-performing management without risking the REIT’s tax-exempt status. All
of these factors combined lead Graff to conclude that REIT management has both
the incentive and ability to commit funds to overpriced assets. As developed here,
this conclusion should be considered a major, potential agency cost of REITs
engaging in SLBs. Indeed, there is evidence in Hardin and Wolverton (1999) and
Graff, Slade, and Webb (2000) that REIT purchasers of properties in several
markets paid premiums in the range of 26%–32%. Finally, Ang and Friday (2003:
2) examine (equity) REIT governance structure and note that ‘‘This group of ﬁrms
operates in an industry notorious for excessive levels of agency conﬂicts and inside
dealings.’’ They conclude that traditional forms of wealth expropriation are
dwarfed by transactions between the ﬁrm and ﬁrm insiders.Evidence from Tax-Exempt Firms  387
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REIT Qualification Requirements and Income Retention
An alternative view of changes in REIT qualiﬁcation regulations is that they have
been enacted to level the playing ﬁeld and allow REITs to compete more
successfully with fully-taxable, open- or closed-end fund institutional real estate
investment companies. Prior to the RMA of 1986, REITs were prohibited
from self-management. King (1998:37-8) states ‘‘this independent contractor
requirement was a source of irritation for REITs from the beginning.’’ According
to King, this change has fostered both rapid growth for REITs (in the 1990s) and
allowed them to become actively-managed operating companies. Chan, Erickson,
and Wang (2003) conclude that this change not only provided REIT management
the opportunity to improve the efﬁciency of their operating decisions, but also
provided closer alignment of management and shareholder interests. Graff (2001)
points out that under the RMA of 1986, REITs are also allowed to apply the
earnings from qualiﬁed stock and bond investments toward satisfying the 75%
test for up to one year. He also states that the intense lobbying efforts by REITs
to pass the 1999 REIT Modernization Act and get the 95% minimum dividend
payout lowered to 90% demonstrate the value they place on retaining income
(deductions in the form of non-cash, depreciation expenses also act to shield
income). Further, Graff notes that REITs have an incentive to retain ownership of
property that has appreciated, because under the 75% income rule, they are not
required to distribute unrealized capital gains (whereas undistributed earnings are
taxable). Taken altogether, the ability to self-manage, retain greater income, and
an incentive to generate capital gains through investment suggests the possibility
that the changes in regulation for which NAREIT has actively lobbied are intended
to work in the best interests of REIT management (and then presumably the
shareholders).
Leasing from the Lessee’s Viewpoint
There are numerous studies of the effects of leasing announcements on the lessee’s
share price, several of which have been noted previously. One recent study of
SLBs by Ezzell and Vora (2001) ﬁnds evidence that the relation between the
lessee’s gain and its tax rate is negative. They also ﬁnd that gains from SLBs are
greater for low-quality ﬁrms (or ﬁrms with high costs of ﬁnancing) and ﬁrms with
greater information asymmetry. Fisher (2004) employs a model predicting that
lessees will choose shorter lease terms when the asset in the SLB is relatively
more important. She ﬁnds a signiﬁcant positive return for lessee shareholders of
ﬁrms announcing shorter leases. On the other hand, using a unique dataset of the
actual tax rates and indicators of credit strength for the 100 largest lessees (and
lessors as well), Eades and Marston (2002) conclude that taxes and access to
capital are not strong motives in the demand for leasing. Allen, Rutherford, and
Springer (1993) examine real estate leasing from the lessee’s viewpoint. They ﬁnd
a signiﬁcant, positive market response to leasing announcements. Interestingly,
this positive reaction is conﬁned to the period prior to the RMA of 1986. They388  Elayan, Meyer, and Li
interpret their ﬁndings as evidence of the ﬁrm’s management acting to maximize
shareholder wealth.
 Testable Hypotheses, Data Collection, and Method of
Analysis
Agency-Cost Hypothesis for Lessors
The lessor ﬁrms in this sample consist entirely of REITs, and as long as they
satisfy the qualiﬁcation requirements, they are effectively tax exempt. This fact
suggests that motives beyond simple tax arbitrage arguments should be considered
to explain their participation in SLBs. As previously described, Graff (2001) notes
that under the 75% rule, REIT managers have an incentive to reinvest earnings or
investment capital into real estate acquisitions quickly. The present value of future
investment fees is also higher for them than the managers of other institutional
real estate funds. The 5–50 rule has had the unintended effect of insulating poorly-
performing management from hostile takeovers. Investor access to the relevant
information needed to develop accurate assessments of REIT property values is
more severely limited than by other real estate institutions. When these factors
are combined, they suggest incentive, motive, and opportunity for REIT
management to acquire properties through SLBs quickly, and overpay if necessary.
This potentially creates an important agency cost to be borne by REIT
shareholders. Under this Agency-Cost Hypothesis: Share market reaction is
expected to be negative and signiﬁcant to SLB announcements for REIT lessors.
Two variables that are meant to reﬂect these agency-cost effects are employed as
proxies (in the multivariate regression analysis). The ﬁrst variable represents
leverage (LEVG), which is calculated as total liabilities divided by the book value
of equity. This variable is used in many studies as a proxy for an agency problem.
The intuition is that the more leverage a ﬁrm employs, the greater the monitoring
provided by lenders. The expected relationship between the market return and
LEVG is positive, since greater monitoring should increase the cumulative average
abnormal return (CAAR), or equivalently, make it less negative. The second
variable is the ratio of market-to-book-value, which is often used as a proxy for
information asymmetry. This ratio is frequently labeled Tobin’s Q (TQ)i s
estimated as the sum of total liabilities and market value of equity (MVE) divided
by the book value of total assets (TA). The relationship between the CAAR and
TQ is expected to be negative, as higher TQ ratios indicate greater information
asymmetry. This expectation is in accord with Chan, Erickson, and Wang (2003:
209) who state that ‘‘REIT returns appear to be negatively related to their market-
to-book value.’’ Less transparent business operations lead to greater potential
abuse. This factor is thereby expected to generate a more negative market
response.Evidence from Tax-Exempt Firms  389
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Income-Retention Hypothesis for Lessors
The National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts has lobbied actively
and successfully for changes in the regulations that qualify REITs to make them
more competitive with other real estate investment companies. There are two
important changes in the RMA of 1986; namely, the allowance of REITs to
manage themselves internally and the expansion of qualiﬁed income. Further, the
RMA of 1999 lowers the required dividend payout to 90%. Additionally, REITs
are allowed to deduct depreciation and interest expenses, thereby reducing
‘‘taxable income’’ and to retain capital gains. The combination of ﬁrm control of
operations and greater ability to reinvest earnings in themselves suggest that these
changes may be motivated by REITs’ managements’ desire to increase ﬁrm value.
Thus, REIT management may be acting in the best interests of shareholders by
participating in SLBs, given the SLB advantages to REITs compared to normal
purchase-and-lease transactions. The Income-Retention Hypothesis may be stated
as: Share market reaction is expected to be positive and signiﬁcant to SLB
announcements for REIT lessors.
Three variables are employed to test whether the Income-Retention Hypothesis is
more consistent with market reaction to announcements of SLBs. Under this
hypothesis, lower dividend payouts are important and the ﬁrst variable represents
the dividend payout ratio (DPR). It is calculated as dividends paid out divided by
net income. The hypothesis suggests that REITs retaining more income (lower
DPR) should expect a more positive response. This implies there is a negative
expected relationship between DPR and REIT CAARs. The second variable is
return on equity (ROE). It is calculated as net income divided by market value of
equity. Return on equity is generally regarded as the best indicator of ﬁrm
performance from the shareholder’s perspective. Therefore, in the regressions it is
expected to be positively related to market reaction. Depreciation expenses also
act to effectively help retain earnings since they are a non-cash deductible expense.
A third variable, representing depreciation (DEPR), is calculated as depreciation
expenses divided by total assets. Firms with greater depreciation expenses are
shielding more income. Therefore, this variable should be positively related to
market reaction.
Two additional control variables are employed in both lessor regressions: a
variable to control for ﬁrm size and a variable that reﬂects the magnitude of the
SLB transaction. The natural log of sales5 (LNSALES) is used to reﬂect ﬁrm size.
The SLB dollar amount divided by total assets (AMTR) is used to represent the
relative value of the real estate transaction to the REIT purchaser. Although these
variables are not used to distinguish between the two proposed hypotheses, it is
expected that SLB announcements will generate a larger share price reaction for
smaller ﬁrms (negative relation) and when the amount of the deal is larger
(positive relation).390  Elayan, Meyer, and Li
Tax-Benefit Hypothesis for Lessees
Ezzell and Vora (2001) examine the idea that when the lessor ﬁrm has a
comparative advantage in utilizing tax-shield deductions, lessees gain from SLB
transactions. As noted here, although qualiﬁed REITs are effectively tax exempt,
this does not mean that they do not avail themselves of deductible expenses to
decrease the income they are required to pay out under the 90% dividend payout
rule. The beneﬁts to REITs of SLBs (vs. traditional purchase-and-lease
investments) have been described above and SLBs do generate these deductible
expenses. Thus, it is possible that the tax-related beneﬁts accruing to REITs may
be shared with the lessees given that this transaction will be pre-arranged with
the lessee’s tax situation being fully known. The Tax-Beneﬁt Hypothesis is then
stated as: The announcement of a SLB transaction is expected to generate a
signiﬁcant, positive reaction for the lessee if the market expects the tax advantages
to be shared between the lessee and lessor.
The competing hypothesis developed for the lessee (in the next sub-section) also
predicts a positive market response to lessee SLB announcements. Therefore,
several variables are proposed to distinguish between the two hypotheses. First,
if taxes are a motivating factor, then the lessee’s actual tax rate seems an obvious
choice for an explanatory variable. A proxy variable termed TAXRATE is
calculated as tax liability divided by net (after-tax) income.6 The lease payments
arising from the SLB will be a deductible expense to the lessee and should be
relatively more valuable to ﬁrms paying higher taxes. Thus, there is expected to
be a positive relationship between market reaction and TAXRATE. Second,
depreciation (DEPR) is similarly a tax-deductible expense. However, lessees that
already have a large amount of depreciation to deduct may have less potential to
utilize increased lease payment deductions. This reasoning suggests a negative
expected relation between depreciation and market reaction. Third, LEVG is
included as a variable to represent outside monitoring especially with regard to
ﬁrms with greater information asymmetry as represented by TQ. The expected
signs and calculation approach are the same as previously described for the lessor
model.
Obtaining-Financing Hypothesis for Lessees
Sale-leasebacks allow the property-selling ﬁrm (the SLB lessee) the opportunity
to convert bricks and mortar into cash. For ﬁrms with growth opportunities, this
is clearly a method of obtaining additional ﬁnancing without resorting to either
added borrowing or selling new equity. If market participants perceive that the
announcement to lend is a signal of ﬁrm quality and its creditworthiness, and
believe this ﬁnancing will be invested in positive net present value projects, then
announcements of SLBs should generate a positive response. The Obtaining
Financing Hypothesis follows: The announcement of a SLB transaction is expected
to generate a signiﬁcant, positive reaction for the lessee if the market believes the
proceeds will ﬁnance proﬁtable investments.Evidence from Tax-Exempt Firms  391
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The explanatory variables used to provide evidence on this hypothesis are chosen
to reﬂect the lessee’s creditworthiness from the lessor’s perspective. The ﬁrst
variable reﬂects whether or not the lessee’s debt is rated (RATD). Since ﬁrms incur
a signiﬁcant cost to have their debt rated, those that choose to do so would
presumably be more creditworthy. Rated lessees are expected to be able to obtain
a better deal from the lessor. Thus, the relationship between RATD and market
reaction is expected to be positive. A dummy variable, RATD, takes the value of
one if the debt is rated and is zero otherwise. A dummy variable is used instead
of the actual rating points because there are a signiﬁcant number of companies
that are not rated. Lessee proﬁtability (represented by ROE), liquidity (current
ratio), and ability to service debt (times interest earned) are also aspects of the
lessee’s creditworthiness the lessor would possibly wish to evaluate. For each of
these three variables, a higher number is a positive indicator and each is expected
to be positively related to market reaction. The current ratio (CRATIO)i s
calculated as current assets divided by current liabilities. Times interest earned
(TIE) is proxied by net income divided by debt interest expense. A ﬁnal aspect
of the lessee’s ﬁnancial position is the cost of funds (COF). Lessees that are less
creditworthy are expected to have a relatively higher cost of borrowing. Using the
intuition developed above, less creditworthy borrowers should be less able to
extract favorable terms from the lessor. Thus, there is expected to be a negative
relationship between COF and market reaction; COF is represented by debt
interest expense divided by total liabilities. LNSALES and AMTR are used as
control variables in both lessee regression models, as was the case in the lessor
regressions, and they are calculated in the same way.7
 Data Description
Companies included in this study announced a SLB transaction between January
1987 and December 1999 in the United States. An initial search of domestic SLB
real-estate transactions was conducted using Moody’s Bank & Finance Manual,
Reuters’ Business Brieﬁng, Dow Jones Interactive, Factiva, and the Wall Street
Journal Index, and produced 250 transactions. All lessors are required to be
REITs, which reduces the sample to 126 announcements, whereas all lessees are
required to be non-REITs for inclusion in the sample. One hundred and four SLB
announcements in the ﬁnal sample satisfy the following additional criteria. The
announcement date is stated in the sources described above. Daily prices are
available from CRSP for the period from 250 days before to 20 days after the
announcement date. No other confounding events (merger announcements, share
repurchase announcements, earnings announcements, etc.) occur within the ﬁve-
day window centered on the announcement date.
As is shown in Exhibit 1, the ﬁnal sample of 104 announcements consists of 54
identiﬁable lessee ﬁrms and 92 announcements by identiﬁable lessors.8 As a matter
of interest, the general types of properties involved in the announcements are













































1987 2 3.7 2 2.2 2 2 — — — — — — — — — — — —
1988 2 3.7 4 4.3 2 2 — — — — — — — 2 — — — —
1989 1 1.9 2 2.2 1 2 — — — — — — — — — — — —
1990 — — 3 3.3 — 2 — — — — — — — 1 — — — —
1991 — — 4 4.3 — 2 — — — — — — — 2 — — — —
1992 1 1.9 2 2.2 1 2 — — — — — — — — — — — —
1993 2 3.7 2 2.2 — 1 — — — — 1 — 1 1 — — — —
1994 — — 4 4.3 — 1 — — — — — — — 2 — — — 1
1995 3 5.6 4 4.3 3 4 — — — — — — — — — — — —
1996 9 16.6 11 12 8 8 — — — 1 — — 1 1 — 1 — —
1997 17 31.5 21 23 6 7 4 3 1 5 5 6 1 — — — — —
1998 13 24 20 21.7 3 2 5 7 1 — 2 4 1 1 1 3 — 3
1999 4 7.3 13 15 2 4 — — — 2 1 1 1 6 — — — —
Total 54 100 92 100 28 39 9 10 2 8 9 11 5 16 1 4 — 4
Notes: The total sample of 54 lessee and 92 lessor announcements are collected over the period of 1987 to 1999. N is the number of announcements in a
particular year and % shows the proportion they represent of the total. Type describes the kind of property involved in the announcement. HCF stands for
healthcare facilities; HR is a hotel or restaurant; IMF is industrial and manufacturing facilities; OB is ofﬁce buildings; DS is a department store or shopping
center; T is a theatre; O represents others; LSE is lessee; and SO is lessorEvidence from Tax-Exempt Firms  393
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Exhibit 2  Summary Statistics for the Descriptive Variables
Variable N Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Lessee
Amount of the Deal ($m) 54 62.93 29.09 96.86 2.2 480
Maturity of Leasing (years) 31 15.49 15 5.15 7 30.00
Total Assets ($m) 54 887.57 450.04 1,324.70 33.18 6,804.02
Market Value of Equity ($m) 54 615.59 220.85 1,532.98 29.65 8,107.34
Lessor
Amount of the Deal ($m) 92 42.85 22.50 71.56 1.08 480
Maturity of Leasing (years) 54 14.50 15 5.32 3 30
Total Assets ($m) 92 961.16 758.84 783.54 148.56 4,179.98
Market Value of Equity ($m) 92 53,557 499.91 222,451 48.44 1,033,660
Notes: Variable refers to the speciﬁc balance sheet category depicted. N is the number of lessee
and lessor ﬁrms involved in sale-leaseback announcements for which the descriptive statistics are
provided. The amounts for total assets and market value of equity represent the values the year of
the announcement.
industry and manufacturing facilities (IMF), ofﬁce buildings, headquarters and
corporate campuses (OB), department stores, shopping centers and distribution
facilities (DS), theatres (T), and others, which includes golf courses and school
properties (O). Exhibit 1 shows that the majority of properties with known lessors
or lessees are healthcare or retirement facilities. It may also be noted that the bulk
of the transactions in the sample occur after 1995.
Exhibit 2 provides summary statistics of the lease characteristics and selected
variables used in testing the hypotheses. The variable deﬁnitions follow. The
amount (AMT) is the sale price of the property as reported in Moody’s, Reuters’,
or The Wall Street Journal. Maturity (MAT) is the lease agreement period in years
and is gathered from the same sources. Total assets (TA) and market value of
equity (MVE) are taken from Moody’s and DataStream. Market value of equity
equals the average share price multiplied by the number of shares the year before
the announcement.
Method of Analysis
Ball and Brown (1968) originally develop the event-study method of analysis in
a seminal paper, and it is further evaluated by Brown and Warner (1985). The
event-study method is used to estimate the market reaction to SLB announcements
from both the lessor and lessee perspectives. Under this method, abnormal returns
are estimated with the simple market model, i.e., daily observed returns are
assumed to conform to the following structure:394  Elayan, Meyer, and Li
R    R   , (1) j , tjj m , tj , t
where: Rj,t  The continuously-compounded rate of return on security j on day
t;
Rm,t  The rate of return on the CRSP value-weighted market index on
day t;
j  The intercept of the linear relationship for security j;
j  The slope of the linear relationship between security j and the return
on the market index; and
j,t  The unexplained or ‘‘abnormal’’ return (Aj,t) on day t.
The coefﬁcients j and j are estimated with an OLS regression using 160 returns
from trading day t250 through trading day t90 relative to the announcement
date t0. The returns on day t1 through day t1 are designated to capture the
market reaction to the SLB announcement. The average abnormal return (AARt)
for event date t is calculated as a simple cross-sectional average over N ﬁrms in
the sample, as shown in Equation (2). The cumulative average abnormal return
(CAART1,T2) is then computed as the sum over several event days, i.e.,
accumulating from days T1t oT2 inclusive, and it is shown in Equation (3).
N 1
AAR  * Aj,t . (2)   t N j1
NT 2 1
CAAR  * Aj,t . (3)   T1,T2 N j1 tT1
The standardized cross-sectional method is utilized to develop statistics testing for
the signiﬁcance of the abnormal and cumulative average abnormal returns.
Boehmer, Musumeci, and Poulsen (1991) introduce this test and document its
empirical properties. The reasons for adopting these procedures are ﬁrst, this test
accounts for serial dependence of the abnormal returns accumulated over different
intervals. More speciﬁcally, the standardized cross-sectional approach test statistic
accounts for the fact that, within the window, the abnormal returns for each stock
are serially correlated. The serial correlation occurs because all of the abnormal
returns are a function of the same market model intercept and slope estimators.
Second, the test accounts for the possibility of an increase in event date variance
especially using daily return data. This issue is discussed in Sanders and Robins
(1991). Cowan (1992), Mann and Sicherman (1991), and Lee (1992) all utilize
the same approach. To test for the percentage of positive abnormal returns relative
to the percentage of negative, the generalized sign test (binomial sign test) is
utilized. The null hypothesis for the generalized sign test is that the fraction ofEvidence from Tax-Exempt Firms  395
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positive returns is the same as in the estimation period. This same test is utilized
by Chen, Hu, and Shieh (1991) and Cowan (1992).
Cross-Sectional Multivariate Regression Tests
For lessors and lessees, two multiple regression models are employed in an attempt
to distinguish between the proposed hypotheses. In these regressions, the
dependent variable is either the two- or three-day CAAR (results for both are
reported in the tables). The expectations regarding the independent variables are
discussed above. For lessors, the model testing the Agency-Cost Hypothesis is
shown in Equation (4), while the Income-Retention Hypothesis model is shown
in Equation (5).
CAAR     (LNSALES)   (AMTR) 01 2 (4)
  (LEVG)   (TQ)  . 34
CAAR     (LNSALES)   (AMTR)   (DPR) 01 2 3 (5)
  (ROE)   (DEPR)  . 45
The two regression models from the lessee side are shown below. The model in
Equation (6) is used to provide evidence on the variables for the Tax-Beneﬁt
Hypothesis,9 while the Obtaining-Financing Hypothesis model is depicted in
Equation (7).
CAAR     (LNSALES)   (AMTR) 01 2
  (TAXRATE)   (DEPR)   (LEVG) 34 5
  (TQ)  . (6) 6
CAAR     (LNSALES)   (AMTR)   (RATD) 01 2 3
  (ROE)   (CRATIO)   (TIE) 45 6
  (COF)  . (7) 7
The independent variables are as deﬁned previously and  () is the error term.
In the reported results, the traditional t-test is supplemented by the White (1980)
test statistic. This test employs a consistent variance/covariance matrix, which has
been corrected for potential heteroscedasticity in the cross-sectional CAARs.396  Elayan, Meyer, and Li
 Empirical Results
Results from the Market Model
Exhibits 3 and 4 report the market reaction to the SLB announcements for the 92
lessor and 54 lessee ﬁrms, respectively. The two exhibits report the average
abnormal return (AAR), median abnormal return (MAR), and the Z-Statistic
testing if the AAR is signiﬁcantly different from zero. Exhibits 3 and 4 also report
the number of positive versus negative abnormal returns (Pos:Neg), and the
generalized sign Z-test, which considers the signiﬁcance of the difference between
positive versus negative returns. The exhibits also report the CAAR and median
cumulative abnormal return (MCAAR) for six different intervals.
Exhibit 3 shows that for the lessor, the announcement period two-day CAAR
(CAAR2)i s0.08% with a Z-Statistic of 0.45, which is not statistically
signiﬁcant. The number of positive returns is 42 relative to 50 negative returns.
The proportion of positive to negative returns has a generalized sign Z of 0.28,
which is not statistically signiﬁcant. A similarly insigniﬁcant result is found for
the three-day CAARs (CAAR3). These negative returns are consistent with the
Agency-Cost Hypothesis; however, their insigniﬁcance does not lend conﬁrmatory
support for this hypothesis.
Exhibit 4 shows that the announcement period two-day CAAR for the lessee is
4.03% with a Z-value of 4.08, which is statistically signiﬁcant at the 0.1% level.
The number of positive returns is 37 relative to 17 negative returns. The proportion
of positive returns has a generalized sign Z of 2.92, which is statistically signiﬁcant
at the 1% level, indicating that the results are not induced by outliers. The three-
day CAAR is similarly positive and signiﬁcant. These results are also consistent
with the ﬁndings of Slovin, Sushka, and Polonchek (1990) and Ezzell and Vora
(2001). Cross-sectional multivariate regressions are employed for both lessors and
lessees in an attempt to provide clearer support for one hypothesis or the other.
Results for the Cross-Sectional Regressions
Agency-Cost Hypothesis for Lessors. The results of the cross-sectional,
multivariate regressions are shown in Exhibit 5 for the lessor. The results for both
the two-day (CAAR2) and the three-day, (CAAR3) CARR are shown. The exhibit
shows estimated parameter coefﬁcients, the t-test statistic and White statistic
testing whether the parameter estimates are signiﬁcantly different from zero, as
well as the F-value, the adjusted R2, and the number of observations used in the
regression. The results for the Agency-Cost Hypothesis are shown in the top
section of the exhibit.
The regressions with CAAR2 and CAAR3 as the dependent variables show that
the parameter estimates for LEVG are positive as predicted under the Agency-Evidence from Tax-Exempt Firms  397
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Exhibit 3  Average, Median, and Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns Around the SLB Announcement








20 0.12% 0.15% 0.90 92 38:54 1.12
15 0.05% 0.11% 0.23 92 38:54 1.12
10 0.24% 0.15% 1.82 92 38:54 1.12
9 0.15% 0.18% 0.69 92 37:55 1.33
8 0.02% 0.03% 0.11 92 43:49 0.07
7 0.19% 0.19% 1.28 92 51:41 1.60
6 0.13% 0.08% 0.16 92 42:50 0.28
5 0.14% 0.09% 1.06 92 50:42 1.39
4 0.09% 0.10% 0.54 92 38:54 1.12
3 0.05% 0.03% 1.00 92 45:47 0.34
2 0.06% 0.03% 0.66 92 44:48 0.14
1 0.07% 0.14% 0.40 92 40:52 0.70
0 0.16% 0.11% 0.84 92 39:53 0.91
1 0.02% 0.15% 0.30 92 39:53 0.91
2 0.09% 0.09% 0.99 92 43:49 0.07
3 0.19% 0.07% 0.97 92 50:42 1.39
4 0.09% 0.15% 0.47 92 37:55 1.33
5 0.28% 0.12% 1.45 92 50:42 1.39
6 0.07% 0.04% 0.43 92 46:46 0.55
7 0.03% 0.08% 0.17 92 43:49 0.07
8 0.14% 0.06% 0.76 92 40:52 0.70
9 0.29% 0.15% 1.16 92 41:51 0.49
10 0.19% 0.04% 1.01 92 44:48 0.14
15 0.04% 0.04% 0.02 91 39:52 0.81
20 0.03% 0.09% 0.03 91 41:50 0.39
Days CAAR MCAAR Z Pos:Neg
Generalized
Sign Z
(1,0) 0.08% 0.06% 0.45 42:50 0.28
(1,1) 0.07% 0.03% 0.16 46:46 0.55
(5,5) 0.38% 0.04% 1.18 49:43 1.18
(20,2) 0.09% 0.10% 0.15 45:47 0.34
(2,20) 0.48% 0.68% 1.08 40:52 0.70
(20,20) 0.64% 0.69% 0.74 41:51 0.49398  Elayan, Meyer, and Li
Exhibit 3  (continued)
Average, Median, and Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns Around the SLB Announcement
Period for the Lessor
Notes: Average and median abnormal returns are from the market model using the Standardized
Residual Method for the ﬁnal sample of 92 lessor ﬁrms. Z is the statistic testing for a signiﬁcant
difference of the average abnormal return from zero. N is number of ﬁrm returns for a given day.
Pos:Neg shows how many of the ﬁrm returns are positive or negative on a speciﬁc day.
Generalized Sign Z is the non-parametric test statistic for a signiﬁcant difference from zero, which
considers the ratio of positive to negative returns. CAAR is the cumulative average abnormal
return and MCAAR is the median cumulative average abnormal return.
* Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
** Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
*** Signiﬁcant at the 0.1% level.
Cost Hypothesis, and the coefﬁcients are signiﬁcant based on both the t-test and
the White test statistics. The TQ parameter estimate is not found to be signiﬁcant,
although its sign is correct for CAAR3, but not CAAR2. Additionally, the signs
for both the LNSALES and AMTR variables are as expected, although they are not
signiﬁcant. The F-test values for both regressions are signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
The adjusted R2 values show that the regressions explain about 11%–12% of the
variability in the dependent variable, which suggests reasonable explanatory
ability, compared to regression results in similar studies. These results are
interpreted as supporting the agency-cost theory for lessor motives in engaging in
SLBs.
Income-Retention Hypothesis for Lessors. The regression model results portraying
the Income-Retention Hypothesis are shown in the bottom section of Exhibit 5.
The ﬁrm size (LNSALES) and SLB amount variables (AMTR) again have the
expected signs and are similarly insigniﬁcant. The DPR parameter estimate is
positive and signiﬁcant at either the 1% or 0.1% level based on the two- or three-
day CAARs, using both the t-test and White test. However, this result does not
support the Income-Retention Hypothesis, since it suggests that the market
responds positively to ﬁrms paying out more dividends. The signiﬁcant, negative
parameter estimates for DEPR also do not provide support for this hypothesis as
they suggest that lower depreciable expenses are associated with greater market
reaction. The lack of support for this hypothesis is highlighted by the fact that
both of these regression models are signiﬁcant based on their F-values. Further,
the two-day and three-day models both exhibit reasonable explanatory ability as
their adjusted R2 values squares are 0.12 and 0.19, respectively.
Tax-Beneﬁt Hypothesis for Lessees. The Tax-Beneﬁt Hypothesis cross-sectional,
multivariate regression results for the lessee are shown in the upper section of
Exhibit 6. The parameter estimates for the relative amount of the SLB variableEvidence from Tax-Exempt Firms  399
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Exhibit 4  Average, Median, and Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns Around the SLB Announcement








20 0.09% 0.10% 0.46 54 28:26 0.47
15 0.51% 0.12% 0.39 54 25:29 0.34
10 1.25% 0.05% 1.60 54 28:26 0.47
9 0.12% 0.49% 0.29 54 22:32 1.16
8 0.31% 0.20% 0.47 54 34:20 2.11*
7 0.11% 0.25% 0.65 54 33:21 1.83
6 0.16% 0.21% 0.03 54 24:30 0.62
5 0.28% 0.05% 0.80 54 27:27 0.20
4 0.28% 0.06% 0.33 54 25:29 0.34
3 0.15% 0.07% 0.09 54 27:27 0.20
2 0.32% 0.17% 0.57 54 26:28 0.07
1 1.78% 0.42% 3.23** 54 33:21 1.83
0 2.26% 0.92% 3.30*** 54 36:18 2.65**
1 1.13% 0.36% 2.04* 54 33:21 1.83
2 0.34% 0.17% 1.25 54 30:24 1.02
3 0.31% 0.13% 0.29 54 25:29 0.34
4 0.54% 0.60% 1.74 54 22:32 1.16
5 0.40% 0.22% 1.14 54 23:31 0.89
6 0.03% 0.32% 0.72 53 22:31 1.04
7 0.36% 0.22% 0.44 54 23:31 0.89
8 0.26% 0.45% 0.21 54 22:32 1.16
9 0.37% 0.21% 0.57 54 23:31 0.89
10 0.89% 0.74% 1.24 54 23:31 0.89
15 0.48% 0.24% 0.66 54 24:30 0.62
20 0.31% 0.34% 1.28 54 29:25 0.74
Days CAAR MCAAR Z Pos:Neg
Generalized
Sign Z
(1,0) 4.03% 1.90% 4.08*** 37:17 2.92**
(1,1) 5.16% 2.94% 4.29*** 39:15 3.47***
(5,5) 3.78% 3.75% 2.42* 33:21 1.83
(20,2) 0.58% 1.00% 0.13 28:26 0.47
(2,20) 3.51% 3.10% 1.16 19:35 1.98*
(20,20) 2.23% 1.46% 0.56 31:23 1.29400  Elayan, Meyer, and Li
Exhibit 4  (continued)
Average, Median, and Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns Around the SLB Announcement
Period for the Lessee
Notes: Average and Median Abnormal Returns are from the Market Model using the
Standardized Residual Method for the ﬁnal sample of 54 lessee ﬁrms. Z is the statistic testing for a
signiﬁcant difference of the average abnormal return from zero. N is number of ﬁrm returns for a
given day. Pos:Neg shows how many of the ﬁrm returns are positive or negative on a given day.
Generalized Sign Z is the non-parametric test statistic for a signiﬁcant difference from zero which
considers the ratio of positive to negative returns. CAAR is the cumulative average abnormal
return and MCAAR is the median cumulative average abnormal return.
* Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
** Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
*** Signiﬁcant at the 0.1% level.
(AMTR) is signiﬁcant at the 0.1% level for both the CAAR2 and CAAR3
regressions based on both the t-test and White test statistics. Thus, there is a strong
positive relationship between the size of the SLB deal and share price reaction.
However, while the LNSALES variable does not have the expected negative sign,
none of the parameter estimates are signiﬁcant. The sign of the TAXRATE proxy
variable is positive as expected under the Tax-Beneﬁt Hypothesis; however, it is
insigniﬁcant in both regressions. This ﬁnding does not suggest that market reaction
is driven by the lessee’s tax status, and is in accord with the results in Eades and
Marston (2002). The LEVG variable has the expected sign but it is not signiﬁcant.
The TQ variable is negative as expected and is signiﬁcant at the 5% level in the
three-day CAAR regression, based on both the t-test and White test statistics. This
ﬁnding shows there is a more positive market response for SLB lessees, which
are characterized here as having less information asymmetry. Both regressions
exhibit signiﬁcant F-test values and relatively high adjusted R2 values, which is
especially pronounced in the CAAR2 case.
Obtaining-Financing Hypothesis for Lessees. The results of the lessee, cross-
sectional, multivariate regressions testing the Obtaining-Financing Hypothesis are
shown in the lower section of Exhibit 6. The AMTR parameter estimate is positive
as expected and is signiﬁcant at the 0.1% level in both the CAAR2 and CAAR3
regressions. The size control variable (LNSALES) exhibits signiﬁcance at the
10% level; generally, however, its sign is unexpectedly positive. The parameter
estimates for both the rated debt (RATD) and current ratio (CRATIO) variables
have the expected positive sign and are signiﬁcant (at levels ranging from 1% to
10%) in both regressions. Further, the cost of funds regression coefﬁcients are
negative as expected, but they are not found to exhibit signiﬁcance. These ﬁndings
are generally supportive of the predictions developed for the Obtaining-Financing




















































Exhibit 5  Cross-Sectional Multivariate Regression Results for Lessor Announcement Day Returns
Independent Variable Sign
CAAR2
Par. Est. t-Stat White Test
CAAR3
Par. Est. t-Stat White Test
Panel A: Agency Cost Hypothesis
Intercept NA 0.000 0.02 0.02 0.000 0.03 0.03
LNSALES  0.003 1.14 1.57 0.002 0.74 1.03
AMTR  0.016 0.81 0.99 0.037 1.61 1.49
LEVG  0.009 3.26**** 4.04**** 0.010 3.04** 3.15****
TQ  0.002 0.26 0.29 0.002 0.26 0.30
F-Value 3.64*** 3.37***
R2 0.1703 0.1594
Adj. R2 0.1235 0.1121
Panel B: Income Retention Hypothesis
Intercept NA 0.005 0.33 0.48 0.006 0.41 0.57
LNSALES  0.002 0.98 1.44 0.002 0.67 0.93
AMTR  0.009 0.45 0.57 0.029 1.36 1.30
DPR  0.006 3.24*** 9.68**** 0.007 3.59**** 11.52****
ROE  0.034 0.50 0.47 0.008 0.11 0.13
DEPR  0.264 1.42 1.65* 0.509 2.44** 2.53**
F-Value 3.01** 4.45****
R2 0.1769 0.2413






















Exhibit 5  (continued)
Cross-Sectional Multivariate Regression Results for Lessor Announcement Day Returns
Notes: The dependent variables are the two-day (day t  0, day t1) and three-day (t1, t1) cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR2) and
(CAAR3), respectively, for lessor sale-leaseback announcements. For both panels, N  75. Sign is the expected sign of each independent variable. Par. Est.
is the parameter estimate. LNSALES is the natural log of sales. AMTR is the ratio of the loan amount to total assets (TA). LEVG equals total liabilities divided
by book value of equity. TQ is Tobin’s Q, which is the sum of total liabilities and market value of equity (MVE) divided by book value of TA. DPR is dividend
payout ratio found as dividends divided by net income. ROE is return on equity calculated as net income divided by MVE. DEPR is depreciation divided by
TA.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
***Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.




















































Exhibit 6  Cross-Sectional Multivariate Regression Results for Lessee Announcement Day Returns
Independent Variable Sign
CAAR2
Par. Est. t-Stat White Test
CAAR3
Par. Est. t-Stat White Test
Panel A: Tax Beneﬁt Hypothesis
Intercept NA 0.090 2.16* 2.25* 0.065 1.59 1.50
LNSALES  0.010 1.58 1.78 0.009 1.53 1.52
AMTR  0.173 5.54*** 9.28*** 0.104 3.42*** 8.01***
TAXRATE  0.002 0.66 1.39 0.002 0.75 1.50
DEPR  0.448 1.15 1.15 0.452 1.19 1.06
LEVG  0.000 0.01 0.02 0.002 0.94 1.05
TQ  0.003 0.83 1.33 0.007 2.09* 3.26*
F-Value 5.68*** 2.92*
R2 0.4366 0.2851
Adj. R2 0.3598 0.1876
Panel B: Obtaining Financing Hypothesis
Intercept NA 0.122 3.03** 2.93** 0.116 2.39* 2.53*
LNSALES  0.010 1.69* 1.79* 0.014 1.93* 2.19*
AMTR  0.185 7.57*** 11.49*** 0.115 3.92*** 8.02***
RATD  0.048 2.65* 3.18** 0.038 1.74$ 2.08*
ROE  0.074 2.04* 1.56* 0.075 1.72$ 1.00
CRATIO  0.015 2.49* 1.99* 0.014 1.84$ 1.62
TIE  0.0004 0.15 0.20 0.004 1.46 1.64
COF  0.222 0.46 0.58 0.341 0.59 0.72
F-Value 9.27*** 3.37**
R2 0.6432 0.3960






















Exhibit 6  (continued)
Cross-sectional Multivariate Regression Results for Lessee Announcement Day Returns
Notes: The dependent variables are the two-day (day t  0, day t1) and three-day (t1, t1) cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR2) and
(CAAR3), respectively, for lessee sale-leaseback announcements. For Panel A, N  50, for Panel B, N  43. Sign is the expected sign of each independent
variable. Par. Est. is the parameter estimate. N is the number of announcements in a given category. LNSALES is the natural log of sales. AMTR is the ratio
of the loan amount to total assets (TA). TAXRATE is calculated as tax liability divided by net income. DEPR is depreciation divided by TA. LEVG equals total
liabilities (TL) divided by book value of equity. TQ is Tobin’s Q, which is the sum of total liabilities and market value of equity (MVE) divided by book value
of TA. RATD is a dummy variable which takes the value one if the lessee’s debt has a credit rating and is zero otherwise. ROE is return on equity calculated
as net income divided by MVE. CRATIO is the current ratio calculated as current assets divided by current liabilities. TIE is times interest earned and is
calculated as net income divided by debt interest. COF is a measure of the cost of funds found as debt interest divided by TL. NA indicates not applicable.
* Signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
** Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
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are contrary to expectations, and suggest that less proﬁtable ﬁrms are perceived
to beneﬁt more from their participation in SLBs.10 The F-test values are signiﬁcant
at the 0.1% level for both regressions. The adjusted R2 values are 0.57, and 0.28,
for the two-day, and three-day model, respectively, indicating very respectable
levels of explanatory power for the regressions.
 Conclusion
Previous research has found mixed evidence that tax factors motivate the
participants in leasing transactions. Tax-arbitrage arguments suggest that leasing
decisions are motivated by situations where the lessor’s tax rate is higher than that
of the lessee. This study employs a sample of lease transaction announcements
where the REIT lessors may be characterized as effectively tax-exempt in an
attempt to examine non-tax lessor motives.
Changes in the REIT qualiﬁcation regulations are examined to develop possible
lessor rationales linked to either agency-cost considerations or the desire to retain
more income for reinvestment purposes. A line of reasoning is developed showing
that four factors provide REIT management with motive, incentive, and
opportunity to make property investments quickly. They may in fact allow and
encourage REITs to overpay for property investments. If this behavior
characterizes REIT participation as SLB lessors, it suggests that shareholders may
be bearing agency costs from these transactions. This rationale is thereby termed
the Agency-Cost Hypothesis. An alternative view of the REIT qualiﬁcation rule
changes is developed, which suggests that the changes are meant to increase both
management effectiveness and the ability to retain income, which is termed the
Income-Retention Hypothesis. If REITs invest these funds in proﬁtable SLB
investment projects, this suggests a beneﬁcial motivation for these transactions.
The event-study results are inconclusive regarding lessor motives, as the two-day
and three-day CAARs are found to be negative, but they are not statistically
signiﬁcant. The multivariate regression results for the Agency-Cost Hypothesis are
consistent with the expectations as developed. These results support the conclusion
that market reaction reﬂects lower expected agency costs in the presence of greater
monitoring by outside lenders. By comparison, the regression results do not
support the implications developed under the Income-Retention Hypothesis. The
ﬁndings in this case, in fact, show positive market response to SLB announcements
for lessors with both lower deductible depreciation expenses and larger dividend
payouts. These ﬁndings are clearly inconsistent with retaining income.
Previous research ﬁndings on possible lessee motives like gaining tax-related
beneﬁts or obtaining additional funding is mixed, so this research employs a
sample developed to re-examine these explanations. Market reaction to SLB
announcements for lessee ﬁrms is found to be both positive and signiﬁcant. Two-
day (three-day) announcement period cumulative average abnormal returns are in
excess of 4% (5%). Since this ﬁnding is consistent with both explanations,406  Elayan, Meyer, and Li
multiple regression models are employed to generate evidence supporting either
tax beneﬁts or obtaining ﬁnancing. The Tax-Beneﬁt Hypothesis regression
variables representing ﬁrm tax rate and depreciation expenses are not found to be
signiﬁcant as is expected. This casts serious doubt on the validity of tax-related
beneﬁts as a motive. The only signiﬁcant variable from these regressions bearing
on this hypothesis indicates ﬁrms with less information asymmetry experience
stronger market reaction. Conversely, the signiﬁcant Obtaining-Financing
Hypothesis regression results indicate more positive market reaction for lessees
having rated debt and a more favorable liquidity position. This evidence is
consistent with more creditworthy lessees obtaining better terms on the ﬁnancing
obtained through the SLB.
Overall, the regression results for REIT lessors may be interpreted as showing
they beneﬁt from purchasing properties through SLBs11 as there is a positive
relationship between market reaction and the amount of the SLB. An agency-cost
explanation is supported because ﬁrms subject to greater outside monitoring
experience a less negative reaction. However, the apparently contradictory,
insigniﬁcant event-study returns suggest that these beneﬁts do not contain
investment bonuses or penalties that are unavailable to the lessors through other
types of real estate equity investments. This also supports the agency-cost
hypothesis since it is consistent with REITs being required to commit their capital
in a timely manner and suggests that SLBs are not signiﬁcantly different from
other REIT property investments. Taken altogether, these ﬁndings suggest that
SLB transactions are effectively zero net present value projects.
 Endnotes
1 The nature of REIT operations and the regulations they must satisfy to remain qualiﬁed
are detailed in the next section.
2 This fact is veriﬁed by an examination of the 10-K forms of several qualiﬁed REITs.
These reports clearly show the deduction of both types of expenses in the income
statements.
3 Chan, Erickson, and Wang (2003, Table 5.1) show that the average market capitalization
of REITs in 2000 equals $725.7 million, compared to the average for all non-REIT ﬁrms
on the NYSE ($4.674 billion), and the NASDAQ ($792.8 million).
4 An interesting example cited in Pappas (1996:3) describes a SLB ﬁnancing of a property
under construction, which is handled through a ‘‘split-funding’’ arrangement involving
three parties, but which reduces expenses in that there is only one closing and one set
of documents, rather than three.
5 Since the lessor ﬁrm is a REIT, the term SALES applies to items like rental and other
investment income, variously described in a sample of REIT income statements as: lease
payments, mortgage interest, real property income, management fees, and qualiﬁed
property sale proceeds.
6 The regression analysis is also conducted with an alternative tax rate variable calculated
as tax liability divided by the sum of net income plus tax liability. The results are
qualitatively similar.Evidence from Tax-Exempt Firms  407
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7 Given the signiﬁcant evidence from Fisher (2004) cited above, the length of the lease
(MAT) is also considered to be a desirable explanatory, control variable in the lessee
regressions. However, the actual lease maturity is only available for 31 of the 54 usable
lessee announcements. This reduction in the number of lessee observations in the
regression models rendered the results (in comparison to those depicted in this study)
insigniﬁcant based on the F-test statistics and causes the signiﬁcant parameter estimates
to become insigniﬁcant.
8 The ﬁnal number of lessor (lessee) announcements is reduced to 92 (54) due to either
contaminating events during the ﬁve-day announcement period (two days before and
after day 0), there are ten or more missing returns during the 270-day period of analysis
or the ﬁrm is not listed.
9 A dummy variable representing pre-1993 versus post-1993 announcements for both
lessor and lessee tax beneﬁts is employed in alternative regression analysis to test for
an effect due to the regulatory lengthening of depreciation tax beneﬁts. It proves to be
insigniﬁcant in all (four) lessor regressions and is only marginally signiﬁcant (at the
10% level) in one (of four) lessee regressions, possibly due to the small number (8 of
54) of lessee announcements occurring in 1993, or earlier.
10 One of the referees pointed out that this ROE result also suggests the relationship
between the creditworthiness variables employed may be more complicated than that
postulated here. However, that question will be deferred to a future research project.
11 The authors are indebted to one of this journal’s referees for suggesting this conclusion.
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